The crisis in CESEE countries

Severity of the crisis: more serious than in other regions
CESEE countries have been severely hit by the crisis, though there are significant differences within the region. Before the crisis, i.e. up to 2007, CESEE countries seemed to be catching up with the EU15 quickly and reasonably smoothly; this was reflected in forecasts made at that time (Figure 1 ). For example, in October 2007, cumulative GDP growth from 2008 to 2010 was forecast to be 11.4% on average in the region, while, by comparison, the EU15 was predicted to grow by 4.3% during these two years. Some CESEE countries had built up various vulnerabilities, such as huge credit, housing and consumption booms and thus high current account deficits and external debt. It was widely expected that these vulnerabilities would have to be corrected at some point in time. However, the magnitude of the correction, as also reflected by the fall in GDP, was amplified by the global financial and economic crisis. Notes: Country group values are weighted averages (using GDP weights). CESEE26: 26 countries from central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe. Asia25: 25 countries from Asia excluding China. LATAM32: 32 countries from Latin America. Middle East13: 13 countries from the Middle East. Africa48: 48 countries from Africa. Country groups and non-CESEE countries are highlighted. Note that the sum of the first and the third column does not equal the second, partly because the sum of two percentages does not equal the total per cent effect, and partly because the 
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Why were CESEE countries the hardest hit among emerging/developing regions?
The sensitivity of CESEE countries to the crisis is mainly due to three factors:
1. capital flows and financial integration, 2. dependence on foreign trade, 3. migration and remittances. Darvas and Veugelers (2009) demonstrate that foreign trade played a crucial role in the pre-crisis economic growth of CESEE countries, and that their dependence on foreign trade is greater than many other emerging and developing countries. Remittances are also very important for some countries: Moldova (34% of GDP in 2007), Bosnia/Herzegovina (17%), Armenia (14%), Albania (13%), Georgia (7%), Bulgaria and Romania (5%) , and between 2%
and 4% for eight further CESEE countries. In this section, however, we will focus on issues related to capital flows and financial integration.
In general, CESEE countries entered the crisis more vulnerable than other emerging regions, although there are considerable differences within the region. A key feature of these countries is that their pre-crisis growth was associated with rising current account deficits (with the exception of commodity exporters), that is, the correlation between GDP growth and the current account was negative, as the left-hand panel of Figure 2 indicates.
In contrast, correlation was positive in other emerging and developing countries as suggested by the right-hand panel of Figure 2 .
Why does the correlation between the current account (CA) and economic growth differ? As discussed by Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2006) and Collins (2006) , the positive correlation in developing countries could be related to three main mechanisms:
• A demographic shift to reduce the old age dependency ratio increases the labour force, which increases both savings and output, leading to a positive correlation between CA and growth.
• A productivity shock leads to higher income, but financial impediments limit investment and consumption, which again could lead to a positive correlation.
• A policy shift to export promotion, for example the avoidance of exchange rate overvaluation, boosts exports and output leading to a better CA position and higher growth.
On the other hand, the negative correlation observed for CESEE countries may be related to an institutional change (relaxation of previous constraints in accessing foreign capital) and a productivity shock:
• With the prospective and actual EU integration of ten former communist countries and with the better EU prospects of many other CESEE countries, the previous constraints in accessing foreign capital have relaxed or eased substantially. This has led to capital inflows, which in turn contributed to investment, but also to consumption booms and, eventually, current account deficits.
• At the same time, and also related to capital inflows, productivity increased rapidly in most CESEE countries, leading to higher income expectations. This in turn resulted in borrowing according to the textbook mechanism of intertemporal optimisation.
Indeed, capital inflows and GDP growth were accompanied by a substantial growth in credit ( Figure 3 ). For example, the private sector credit to GDP ratio was 20% in Latvia in 2000, rising to almost 100% of GDP by 2007. In the meantime, GDP also grew by about 10% per year in real terms on average. 4 Since the banking system has a crucial role in financing CESEE economies, its stabilisation must be a high priority. The key question is the role played by the budget in the previous credit boom and in the stabilisation of the banking system now. The previous credit boom was mainly related to the private sector and the ratio of government debt to GDP was generally low in the region (Figure 4 ). Budget deficits varied, fiscal policy was procyclical in many countries (see the next section), but in general the budget was not a serious problem (apart from some outliers like Hungary). Many authors even called for an active use of budget policy due to the large infrastructure investment needs of these countries, rather than for saving for rainy days. With the benefit of hindsight we of course A z e r b a i j a n U k r a i n e P o l a n d B u l g a r i a M o l d o v a R o m a n i a H u n g a r y C r o a t i a R u s s i a n L a t v i a E s t o n i a L i t h u a n i a A r m e n i a A z e r b a i j a n U k r a i n e G e o r g i a B u l g a r i a M o l d o v a R o m a n i a H u n g a r y C r o a t i a R u s s i a n F e d e r a t i o n C E S E E 2 6 T u r k e y know now that budget policy should have been more conservative during the good times in most countries to create fiscal space for counter-cyclical policy in the downturn.
There is unpleasant asymmetry regarding the banking system: it was the private sector that incurred most of the debt, but the public sector has to adjust substantially and clean up the mess now. 5 This asymmetry is similar to the Stability and Growth Pact's failure (with its narrow focus on budgets) to preserve the euro area's stability.
These factors call for strengthened regulation and supervision, as well as creation of institutions for anti-cyclical budget policies.
Despite the low level of government debt, credit-default swaps on government bonds (which is a measure of the cost of insurance against government default) have increased substantially ( Figure 5 ). The huge rise in government-default probability on the one hand, and the low level of government debt on the other, are puzzling. Furthermore, creditdefault swaps on government bonds do not relate to the general government debt/GDP ratio (left-hand side panel of Figure 6 ).
The most likely solution to this puzzle could be related to the risk inherent in private sector debt in many countries, which is (in some countries) held mostly in foreign currencies.
The magnitude of the eventual bank losses is still highly uncertain, and in countries where foreign banks are prevalent, burden sharing is an issue. Should the economic outlook deteriorate further, and/or the exchange rate collapse (e.g. Baltics), or fall further (e.g. Hungary, Ukraine), then even deeper economic crises may emerge that could lead to more bankruptcies, unmanageable bank losses and the complete drying up of foreign capital. These factors may end in a government default, despite the low level of government debt.
Indeed, government default risk is now related to external indebtedness defined as net foreign loan and debt liabilities (right-hand side panel of Figure 6 ). It is noteworthy that before the crisis the cost of insurance against government default was not related to external indebtedness. This suggests that risk pricing was done incorrectly before the crisis.
Cyclicality of budget policy in CESEE countries
A growing empirical literature demonstrates that fiscal policy in emerging and developing countries tends to be pro-cyclical, while it is a-cyclical or counter-cyclical in most developed countries. A pro-cyclical budget policy amplifies both the boom and the bust phases of the economic cycle. During the boom period, the amplifying effect contributes to the build-up of vulnerabilities both directly and indirectly. It also has an impact if the faster economic growth that results from the pro-cyclical budget policy induces agents to expect a brighter future and consequently to borrow against their expected future income. During the bust period, the pro-cyclical fiscal policy required by, Figure 6 . The relation of credit-default swaps on government bonds to public debt and net foreign loan and debt liabilities Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) have coined this phenomenon as "when it rains, it pours". It cannot be optimal from any theoretical perspective to reinforce the business cycle by expanding budget policy in good times and contracting it in bad times (see Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008 , for further discussion).
Consequently, analysing the cyclical nature of budget policy may shed light on whether or not budget policy in CESEE countries also contributed to the severity of the crisis by amplifying the economic cycle during good times. It is instructive to start the analysis with some simple correlation measures that may hint at pro-cyclicality, and then to continue with a structural analysis. The general result for developed countries shown in the last eight rows of the table is a close to zero or negative correlation, regardless of the sample period considered. Hence, the simple correlation coefficient confirms the a-cyclical or counter-cyclical budget policy finding that is found as a result of more structural analysis in the literature.
Correlation of output and government consumption using annual data
In contrast, the general result for many CESEE countries is a positive correlation suggesting pro-cyclicality, though there are exceptions. Results for some CESEE countries are different for different time periods, which make us cautious when interpreting the results. To sum up, although there are important country-specific differences (e.g. Cyprus and the Czech Republic were found to have negative correlations in all sample periods), many CESEE countries indicate a positive correlation between GDP and government consumption growth, in at least one of the sample periods we studied. In contrast, the correlation is close to zero or negative in developed countries, irrespective of the time period studied.
Structural vector-autoregressions using quarterly data
As highlighted by Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) , a positive correlation between GDP and government consumption does not imply causality. Pro-cyclicality would require a causal effect from GDP growth to government consumption growth. However, a positive correlation between the two variables may be the result of a causal effect from government consumption to GDP, i.e. the expansionary effect of government consumption. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) , we employ structural vectorautoregressions (SVAR) to identify the effects of output shocks on government consumption using quarterly data. The model has the following form: • Identification of shocks: Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) , we assumed that an unexpected shock 8 to GDP does not have a contemporaneous effect on government consumption, but an unexpected shock to government consumption may affect GDP contemporaneously.
• Measurement of variables: In contrast to Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) who de-trended GDP and government consumption using linear and quadratic trends before making estimates, we included the variables in log-levels. There are various de-trending methods adopted in the literature, and empirical results might depend on the specific filter adopted, as demonstrated in Canova (1998) . Estimates for the levels, however, is consistent irrespective of whether or not there is a co-integrating relationship among the variables, though in small samples the estimate may be biased.
• • Lag length: We used Schwarz information criterion to determine the lag length. 9 Figure 7 shows the response of government consumption to an unanticipated GDP shock for the 20 CESEE countries for which quarterly data are available. The results are broadly consistent with our earlier findings shown in Table 1 . With a few exceptions, government consumption reacted positively to unexpected GDP shocks. The most procyclical budget policy was observed in Hungary: a 1% positive GDP shock caused a more than three percentage point rise in government consumption at the two-year horizon, according to the point estimate, though the confidence band is very wide. The positive effect is sizable in many other countries as well. The key exceptions are Croatia (which is found to be a-cyclical), the Czech Republic and Estonia (in which the point estimates of the impulse responses are very close to zero with a wide confidence band), Cyprus (which shows an initial counter-cyclical reaction followed by a delayed pro-cyclicality at about 1.5 years after the shock 10 ), and Romania (in which a contemporaneous pro-cyclical impact is followed by a small and insignificant counter-cyclical response).
Why would most CESEE countries, in contrast to developed countries, pursue a procyclical fiscal policy that might exacerbate the business cycle? Based on an extensive literature review concerning fiscal policy in developing countries, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) conclude that there are two main explanations:
1. Imperfections in international credit markets prevent developing countries from borrowing in bad times.
2. Political economy explanations typically based on the idea that good times encourage fiscal profligacy and/or rent-seeking activities. We calculated the seasonal adjustment by using the Census X12 method.
As far as imperfections in international credit markets are concerned, further integration of CESEE countries into the EU could ease this problem. However, as the cases of Greece and Hungary underline, it is euro-area membership that makes a difference. Both countries are members of the EU, but only Greece is a member of the euro area. While the main fundamentals were worse in Greece than in Hungary, Greece has fared much better than Hungary in the first year of the post-Lehman Brothers period of the current crisis.
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On the other hand, many CESEE countries also pursued pro-cyclical policies in good times when credit from foreign sources was abundant. Consequently, political economy factors may be highly relevant in explaining the pro-cyclical budgetary policies of these countries.
We return to the issue of euro-area entry and the need for improvements in budgetary governance in the final section of this article.
The impact of the crisis on budget policy: main channels
The crisis has, through various channels, had a significant impact on the budget policy of all countries, including CESEE countries. However the strength of certain channels varies across countries according to their specific circumstances. Figure 8 indicates the headline budget deficit numbers for CESEE countries in comparison with some major economies.
Budget deficits outcomes are rather diverse and are related to a large number of factors, to be discussed later.
From the perspective of most CESEE countries, the impact of the crisis can be summarised as: 1) a significant revenue shortfall; 2) changes in the global economic environment that have led to external financial constraints and less growth in main export destination markets; and 3) a significant change in the medium/long-term outlook. 
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Direct fiscal impact
The most serious impact of the crisis on budget policy has been felt on the revenue side. With declining economic activity, all kinds of tax revenues decline. Progressive income taxes and corporate taxes act as automatic stabilisers, as do unemployment and other welfare benefits. In addition, countries that have scope may engage in discretionary fiscal stimulus programmes to boost domestic demand. We believe that the current economic environment is a classical Keynesian situation that would in principle demand such discretionary policies. However, as we will discuss in more detail in Section 6, both the desirability of, and the scope for, such actions fundamentally depend on the circumstances of individual countries, such as their size and openness, the credibility and strength of fiscal institutions, and the level of government debt. Last, but not least, fiscal support for the financial sector (which is different from discretionary fiscal stimulus) has a crucial role, as the health of the banking system and its potential for credit expansion is crucial for the recovery.
Changes in the global economic environment
Changes Second, the capital that is available will be more expensive, and risk premiums are expected to remain considerably higher than their pre-crisis levels, implying a higher cost of capital for all economic sectors, including the government. Indicators measuring the risk that emerging and developing countries represent for lenders, such as credit default swaps ( Figure 5 ) or emerging market bond indices, have shown dramatic increases, suggesting a rise in risk perceptions. These indicators measure current risk perceptions, but it is unlikely that risk perception will decline to pre-crisis levels in the near future.
Some authors argue that emerging market bond spreads and credit default swaps were unjustifiably low before the crisis and hence a return to that situation is unlikely. Fourth, migration may also be affected. Some countries in the region have experienced very large outflows of workers to richer economies, with citizens from the new EU member states and western Balkan countries heading primarily to western Europe, and those of CIS countries heading to the Russian Federation. With the economic slowdown in western
Europe and the Russian Federation, labour outflows may slow and even partially reverse.
Remittances, which play a very significant role in some of these countries, could dwindle substantially. These developments would have additional adverse consequences. If some of the countries in the region experience very large economic contractions over extended periods, then migration outflows may speed up again, exacerbating the effects of the crisis and undermining the long term prospects of some countries. 12 Finally, in addition to reduced capital flows, rising risk premia, declining trade, falling remittances and potential reverse migration, developments in the major economies may themselves have major impacts on CESEE countries. Major economies have accumulated huge budget deficits, as a consequence of automatic stabilisers, and also as a result of the huge support given to the financial sector, and discretionary fiscal stimulus in some cases.
This has led to abrupt increases in government debt in major economies, which will require more countercyclical fiscal policy in the future to maintain credibility. However, prolonged budgetary adjustments in major economies run the risk of reducing growth for a prolonged period (perhaps after an initial rebound immediately after the crisis due to huge output gaps that will have likely emerged). Such a prolonged adjustment in major economies will significantly impact CESEE countries.
Reconsideration of the medium-and long-term economic outlook
For all of the reasons discussed so far, the previous "growth model" of CESEE countries is at risk, and substantial downgrades in growth prospects compared to the pre-crisis outlook can be expected. 13 Reconsideration of the medium-and long-term economic outlook for these countries will have consequences for future budgetary policies. In particular, budgetary expenditure planning must consider new revenue realities.
Furthermore, the crisis will likely have lasting negative wealth effects on these countries. The fall in the price of certain assets, and their future outlook, should be evaluated in the light of pre-crisis expectations for these prices. While asset prices will likely bottom out, if they have not yet done so, their future outlook is not just uncertain, it is also likely that there will be a downward shift in price levels compared to the pre-crisis outlook. 14 The fall in housing prices impacts especially those countries that had huge housing booms in previous years. 15 The fall in commodity prices impacts commodity exporter countries. 16 Wherever foreign currency loans were granted and the exchange rate has depreciated, a wealth effect operates because of the increased debt/income ratio. Increases in the interest rate, both for domestic and foreign currency denominated loans, increases the debt service/income ratio.
Many of the countries have funded pension systems, and the losses assumed directly challenge those who are to retire in the coming years. The downgraded prospects compared to pre-crisis outlooks will also have an effect.
The consequence of all of these wealth effects is a downward shift in consumption patterns. The current crisis is different from a "regular" bust in a business cycle.
Consumption smoothing, if any, will work to a much lesser extent. Instead, heightened falls in consumption are likely due to changed expectations about the future, to wealth effects and also to the difficulties in obtaining credit (supply plus higher real interest rates).
Budget policy reactions in CESEE countries
Budget policy reactions can be understood only in the broader context of other macroeconomic policies and constraints. Due to the substantial revenue shortfall and external financing constraints, most countries simply do not have scope for discretionary fiscal stimulus. In addition, many countries face significant confidence constraints as well.
Eight countries (Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine) have standby agreements with the IMF, 17 and Turkey is in talks. The loans granted under these agreements are conditional on the implementation of a comprehensive economic programme aimed at ensuring fiscal consolidation, structural reform and support for the financial system. 18
On the other hand, the Russian Federation, a large and not-so-open economy with huge fiscal reserves (and low gross government debt, see Figure 4 ) has scope for fiscal stimulus, and indeed has rightly embarked on a significant fiscal stimulus programme.
However, as also highlighted by, e.g. World Bank (2009a), the scope for further fiscal stimulus in 2009 and 2010 appears limited due to the remaining downside risks in the global and Russian economies, and the exhaustion of a large part of Russia's Reserve Fund.
Because of its low government debt, the Russian Federation has room to borrow externally, which is indeed planned for 2010. But while that is being done, longer term fiscal sustainability should be prioritised, which will require reforms to broaden the revenue base and ensure greater efficiency in public and social programmes.
In parallel with budget constraints, monetary policy reactions were varied across countries. Three-month interbank interest rates also reflected this ( Figure 9 ). Some countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland and Slovak Republic) cautiously cut interest rates, while others had to raise them substantially (e.g. Hungary and Romania). Monetary policy actions were determined by pressures on exchange rates, currency composition of debt, and of course by the credibility of economic policies and inflation prospects. The Russian report our own data collected from various sources, which cover all 26 CESEE countries. Table 2 shows that the Russian Federation adopted the largest stimulus among Turkey's discretionary fiscal stimulus is the second lowest among G20 countries. The
June 2009 stimulus, which is not included in IMF (2009) and hence Table 2 , is estimated to be 0.3% of GDP. Table 3 indicates that most of the EU member CESEE countries have not implemented discretionary stimulus measures. Direct measures for supporting the financial sector were generally low or zero in CESEE countries (see Tables 4 and 5 and Annex A). Four CESEE countries (Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation and Turkey) are included in IMF (2009) in this respect (reported in Table 4 ). As an integral part of its IMF programme, Hungary gave the largest (among these four countries, in terms of GDP) support to the financial sector that required upfront government financing. Still, measures in all four countries have been dwarfed by the measures that have taken in advanced G20 countries, which are reported in the last row of The key reason for this discrepancy is that CESEE countries did not hold US-related toxic assets. However, domestic losses due to falling income, rising unemployment, the bursting housing booms, currency depreciation and increases in retail interest rates, increase the ratio of non-performing loans and lead to risks of huge losses in some countries. Again, there are substantial differences across the 26 CESEE countries.
The banking system plays a crucial role in financing CESEE economies. Furthermore, due to the substantial foreign ownership of the banking system in many CESEE countries, the behaviour of foreign banks is decisive for these countries. In recognition of these factors, there has been strong international backing for stabilisation of financial systems in CESEE countries, thereby easing the pressure on their budget policies (see Box 2). 
Lessons from previous emerging market crises to budget policy
Previous economic crises were a major cause of structural reforms in general, and of the budget in particular. 
Box 2. External support for the CESEE financial sector
The EU's commitment not to let any systemically important bank fail in the euro area, or in Sweden (whose banks own most of the banking system in the Baltic countries), the commitment that packages designed to help international banking groups can also benefit their subsidiaries, and the European Central Bank's liquidity support to euro-area banking groups, have also helped their subsidiaries in the CESEE region.
Efforts to stabilise the financial system in CESEE countries (irrespective of the ownership structure) are supported by the joint action plan of the EBRD, EIB Group and World Bank Group, unveiled on 27 February 2009. This initiative aims to support the CESEE banking sectors and bank lending to businesses, in particular to small and medium-sized firms, up to a level of EUR 24.5 billion over two years in the form of equity and debt finance, credit lines, and political risk insurance.
The so-called "Vienna Initiative", which is a multilateral effort to secure financial sector stability in those CESEE countries with substantial foreign bank ownership, aims to stimulate coordination between all relevant stakeholders, including international banking groups, home and host country authorities, international financial institutions and the EU. The aim of the initiative is to develop a common understanding on key issues, to secure the commitments made by both international banking groups and home and host country authorities, and to coordinate a fair burden-sharing.
Furthermore, agreements between central banks, most notably the euro/lats swap offered to Latvia by the Danish and Swedish central banks and the Swedish krona/Estonian kroon swap offered by Sweden to Estonia, are also helpful for the stability of the banking sector. The option of getting foreign exchange liquidity in exchange for domestic currency alleviates the pressure on domestic currency markets.
Consolidated general government expenditures were cut substantially from a peak value of 48% of GDP in 1997 to 34% of GDP in 2000. The average expenditure ratio over 1999-2007 was also 34% of GDP and hence the consolidation turned out to be permanent with little time variation (Figure 10) . 20 The largest declines in non-interest spending, compared to the pre-crisis years, have been in transfers to regions and in capital expenditures. However, wages, social transfers, and defence spending have also been cut.
Many inefficient subsidies were abolished, levelling the playing field. Interest costs, measured in rubles, rose with the exchange rate depreciation following the 1998 crisis, but after rescheduling the debt, cash interest spending also decreased from over 4.5% of GDP in 1995-97 to about 3% in 2000.
The government continued its tax crusade against the oligarchs, launched in 1997-98, with success. The government started applying the tax laws to big enterprises, especially the oil and gas companies, which had previously enjoyed individually negotiated tax rates.
Substantial progress was also made in monetisation and rollback of barter, which had risen to 54% of all inter-company payments in 1998, but fell back below 15% by 2001, and continued to fall in subsequent years.
At the same time, revenues were centralised away from the regions to the central In 1998, the federal government announced its first Fiscal Stabilisation Programme, comprising four initiatives: 1) fiscal adjustment to increase the primary surplus of the consolidated public sector (in contrast to the pre-crisis close-to-zero and small negative primary balances, a primary balance target of plus 3.75% of GDP was introduced, which was later raised to 4.25%); 2) institutional reform, including the social security system and administrative reform; 3) redesign of fiscal federalism based on a comprehensive debt financing and restructuring agreement with federal states and local governments; and institutional sanctions for non-compliance. Brazil's public sector had substantial foreign currency liabilities before the 1998 crisis, but it could gradually reduce the foreign exchange exposure to less than 10% of GDP. Fiscal policy was accompanied by strict monetary policy with inflation targeting under floating exchange rates, which was again a fundamental revision of pre-1999 policies. Fiscal reforms played a crucial role in Brazil's good growth performance after 1999 and in Brazil's resistance to the current global crisis.
Budget policy options in CESEE countries
In principle, the current global economic environment calls for Keynesian policies.
Although potential output is also likely to be falling in all countries of the world, actual output is falling to a much greater extent. As a result, in many countries large negative output gaps are expected, and hence the fall in actual output is not just a case of correcting pre-crisis positive output gaps that existed in many countries, including the CESEE region.
Furthermore, the development of large negative output gaps is not just the result of domestic factors. The current crisis is likely to be a once-in-a-generation event, affecting all countries world wide. The falls in external demand and remittances are clearly external factors, as well as disturbances in international financial markets and the resulting global changes in liquidity and capital flows to emerging and developing countries.
Temporary discretionary fiscal actions, as well as monetary policy easing, are precisely suitable for overcoming the demand shortage. Many countries, most notably major economies but also many emerging economies, are rightly adopting various fiscal stimulus measures (see Table 2 ).
In CESEE countries, government debt is generally low in most (but not all) cases (see Figure 4) . In principle, this would provide even more room for discretionary fiscal stimulus.
Having said that, the viability of discretionary fiscal stimulus in CESEE countries has to be looked at from the angle of country-specific circumstances.
First, financial constraints pose unavoidable limitations to such policies. Even countries with low government debt levels and substantial fiscal reserves, such as Estonia, are seriously constrained by the revenue shortfall resulting from the unexpected depth of the recession. Contingent liabilities should also be taken into account when deciding on discretionary measures. The crisis has substantially increased the risk of further government intervention in the banking system. Furthermore, the debt level tolerance of markets is lower for emerging and developing countries than it is for major economies.
Government debt defaults occurred at reasonably low debt levels (see, for example, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006) . For example, among recent cases of government default, the public debt-to-GDP ratio was 37% in Ukraine, 45% in Argentina, 54% in the Russian Federation and 66% in Ecuador, in the year before the government default. Third, the results of the fiscal stimulus very much depend on the strength and credibility of fiscal institutions. Figure 11 presents the four out of the six World Bank governance indicators on which governments have the greatest impact. Although large variation is evident, in many countries government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption and the rule of law still lags substantially behind the EU15 and the United States. 24 Fourth, related to the previous point, the potential effect of stimulus programmes on investors' confidence should be considered. The weaker the credibility of the stimulus programme is, the more likely it will result in increased risk perception and, eventually, higher interest rates and capital outflows.
Fifth, as capital is becoming scarce, the potential for private investment to be crowded out is also an important factor for countries facing external financing constraints.
Regarding the above list of issues, there is a key dividing line between CESEE countries.
On the one hand, the Russian Federation is big, has low debt and substantial fiscal reserves and hence may be less exposed to the risk of loss of investors' confidence, especially since the rouble has been allowed to depreciate significantly. Discretionary fiscal stimulus was the right decision for the Russian Federation. Azerbaijan also has substantial reserves and its economy is still expected to grow by about 7.5%, both in 2009 and 2010 (see Figure 1 ).
On the other hand, all other countries have much narrower or even zero scope for discretionary measures, though there are important differences between countries. Poland and Turkey, for example, are larger countries than most of the CESEE, and their debt levels are around 50% of GDP. Such a debt level is higher than in many other CESEE countries, but still at a level that does not itself pose a risk of a loss of credibility, provided that the stimulus package is implemented in a credible and timely way. The Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the latter two of which enjoy the sheltering effect of the euro area, also have greater scope for fiscal stimulus, as they did not accumulate significant vulnerabilities before the crisis. However, their small and open economy characteristics certainly limit the effectiveness of Keynesian policies on their domestic economies.
Countries that have had to rely on IMF programmes have no scope at all for stimulus, and other CESEE countries should be very cautious as well.
The limited scope for fiscal stimulus leads us to ask if the crisis can be used as an opportunity to reform fiscal institutions, improve their quality and embark on a necessary budgetary consolidation. As we discussed in Section 5, many previous crises prompted substantial fiscal reforms and serious budget cuts, despite earlier arguments that challenging interest groups and reducing public expenditures would be impossible.
External financial constraints, while costly in the short run, help to expose the weaknesses of fiscal institutions, and prompt reforms that have the potential of paving the way to much better macroeconomic outcomes. The crisis is certainly very painful in many respects. Unemployment has increased dramatically in many countries; many people have lost their homes; many corporations have gone bankrupt, etc. However, the crisis, and especially its global nature, also helps in communicating to the general public the need for budgetary adjustment and structural reforms, including fiscal reforms. 
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A z e r b a i j a n U k r a i n e G e o r g i a B u l g a r i a M o l d o v a R o m a n i a H u n g a r y C r o a t i a R u s s i a n F e d e r a t i o n C E S E E 2 6 T u r k e y Still, there are limits, and highly pro-cyclical budget cuts during a severe recession should be avoided. For example, the latest forecasts for GDP falls in Latvia in 2009 are in the 15-20% range. The Latvian authorities decided to maintain the exchange rate peg and had no other choice but to rely on the international community for emergency financing. As the recession became much deeper than what had been seen up to the point when the programme was designed, the budget deficit widened even more, requiring additional and substantial fiscal efforts to limit it, so that Latvia could receive the subsequent tranches provided by the financing programmes. This happened even though international financial institutions agreed to somewhat higher deficit levels. In June 2009, the Latvian Parliament passed a new budget law with additional cuts. While much blame can be laid on the Latvian side for past behaviour (in particular, fiscal expenditures were increased substantially before the crisis and little was done to limit the credit boom and the huge current account deficit) the EU should be more flexible with regard to Baltic aspirations to join the euro area.
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Regarding budget policy options for the future, some general principles could be laid down:
• As a priority that is relevant both for the very short run and the longer term, the good functioning of the financial system should be maintained. At the same time, so-called "zombie lending" should be avoided. 26
• The crisis should be used as an opportunity for structural reforms to enhance growth in general and fiscal frameworks in particular. Reforms to avoid future pro-cyclical policies, and to increase credibility and the quality of budgeting, such as fiscal responsibility laws comprising medium-term fiscal frameworks, fiscal rules 27 and independent fiscal councils, should be considered where such institutions do not exist. When fiscal consolidation is accompanied by fiscal reforms that increase credibility, non-Keynesian effects 28 may offset the contraction caused by the consolidation to some extent.
• Protection of the most vulnerable should be prioritised. Unemployment has different social consequences in rich and poor countries. In poor countries, household saving is typically lower and the risk of poverty is larger.
• Debates over healthcare and pension reforms should be re-opened, especially in countries facing serious demographic pressures.
• Spending on pro-growth policies, such as education and innovation, should be maintained but rationalised so as not to destroy the longer term post-crisis growth prospects of these countries.
• Long-term fiscal sustainability should be highly prioritised. All of the above recommendations would contribute to this.
How to do all of these at the same time when significant fiscal consolidation is needed in many countries? There are some countries that did manage this during crisis episodes.
Let us quote a sentence from Henriksson's (2007) excellent essay on "Ten Lessons About
Budget Consolidation", which was inspired by his active involvement in the dramatic Swedish budgetary measures that were taken after the crisis of the early 1990s: 29 "The bottom line may thus be: if you have to consolidate, wait for a deep crisis to occur, and it will be easy to do, easy to communicate and easy to be re-elected." The crisis is here now and the opportunity should not be missed. The information in this article with reference to "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey will preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus issue".
2. In our view, comparison to a benchmark, i.e. the downward revision of the forecast level of GDP at a future date, is a better measure of the severity of the crisis than the actual fall in GDP. For example, zero growth has a different meaning for a country that has been used to growing and was expected to continue to grow in the future by 2% per year, than for a country in which these numbers are 6% per year. Nevertheless, we also show and discuss actual changes in GDP.
3. China is included separately in Figure 1 . (2008) for further details on capital inflows and credit growth in the EU member CESEE countries.
See Darvas and Szapáry
5. For example, Latvia is trying to implement heroic efforts to cut the budget deficit in the context of a GDP fall of about 15-20% in a single year.
6. It is preferable to use government consumption rather than, e.g. government expenditures or balance, for studying the pro-cyclical nature of budget policy, because these latter indicators are strongly influenced by the business cycle (e.g. through transfers, debt service and tax revenues), while government consumption is a more direct policy tool. See Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) for a detailed discussion.
7. Quarterly data before 1995 are generally not available for CESEE countries, but even if available, they are likely burdened with substantial structural changes. Still, our sample starting in 1995 may also include structural breaks due to, for example, changes in fiscal policy regimes, which would necessitate time-varying parameter SVARs. This issue is left for further research.
8. Note that impulse response functions in SVARs measure the effects of unanticipated shocks.
9. In the case of Poland, the Schwarz information criterion suggested two lags. However, with two lags the estimated model turned out to have an unstable root, and the impulse response functions became explosive. We therefore used only one lag for Poland.
10. Using a panel of developed countries, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) also found such a pattern.
11. For example, Greece has had much higher government debt and a much higher current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP) than Hungary in the past few years. Immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Hungary experienced serious speculative attacks on its currency and government bond markets, and had to rely on a multilateral financial assistance programme, while tensions in Greece were milder, at least till the finalisation of the article (November 2009). Hungary's current account deficit is expected to shrink from 6% of GDP in 2007 to 3% of GDP in 2009 and 2010, while Greece is still expected to have a current account deficit in excess of 11% of GDP both in 2009 and in 2010, according to the October 2009 forecasts of the IMF. The government debtto-GDP ratio is also expected to remain much higher in Greece than in Hungary. In June 2009 the spread over German ten-year government bond was 186 basis points for Greece and 668 basis points for Hungary.
While macroeconomic indicators were in many cases better for Hungary than Greece, Hungary was still one of the weakest among the new EU member states, and hence it was not surprising that Hungary was the first to turn to the IMF for emergency financing. Our calculations indicate that Hungarian fiscal policy was the most pro-cyclical among the 26 CESEE countries, and government debt was also the highest in 2007 (Figure 4 ). Government expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) was also the highest in Hungary and not just because of higher interest spending. By using a proper method to compare government expenditures in four new EU member states, Kiss and Szemere (2009) conclude that the Hungarian government spends considerably more than its neighbours.
12. Ahearne et al. (2009) 18. As a precautionary measure, Poland has applied for, and received, the IMF's new Flexible Credit Line, which is granted to countries that adopted sound policies in the past.
19. Main sources for the Russian summary are IMF (2000, 2001) and Åslund (2007) .
20. By studying 85 fiscal consolidation episodes in 24 OECD countries since 1978, OECD (2007) finds that consolidations based on expenditure cuts, including social spending cuts, tended to be larger and longer-lasting than consolidations based on revenue increases.
21. Key elements include reduction in, and consolidation of, social fund contributions, improvements to VAT, sharp reduction in turnover taxes, the introduction of a flat personal income tax at a reduced average rate, strengthened excise taxes, amendments to the profit tax that reduce the rate while eliminating most exemptions, and a new simplified system for the taxation of mineral resources.
22. As OECD (2009) emphasises, temporary factors have also contributed to the strong recovery after the Russian crisis of 1998, including the undervaluation of the rouble, low capacity utilisation and spare labour resources.
23. The main source for the Brazilian summary is Goldfajn and Guardia (2004) .
24. A direct measure of the quality of fiscal institutions is presented in, e.g. Fabrizio and Mody (2008) , for EU member countries (for which data are available). The index shows that some EU member CESEE countries lag behind the EU15.
25. There are serious concerns with the euro accession criteria. Two decades after the designing of the criteria and one decade since the launch of the euro, it is time to reform the criteria and to strengthen their economic rationale. There is a straightforward way to do that: the EU treaty itself specifies an obligation on the Council to lay down the details of the convergence criteria and the excessive deficit procedure. See the economic and legal aspects of reforming the criteria in Darvas (2009).
26. On zombies see, for example, Ahearne and Shinada (2005) and Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2006) .
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. Kopits (2004) argues that fiscal policy rules (if well designed and properly implemented) can be useful commitment tools for emerging market economies exposed to macroeconomic volatility and high capital mobility. They can be instrumental in avoiding myopic policies that result from dynamic inconsistency and or/political distortions, and in a broader sense they can help to depoliticise the macroeconomic policy framework. Regarding the interaction of fiscal rules and fiscal consolidations, OECD (2007) finds that countries with fiscal rules achieved better results in consolidating public finances. Furthermore, fiscal rules can also contribute to better performance in a monetary union. As Darvas, Rose and Szapáry (2007) have shown, when a country has a chance to run a substantially and persistently higher budget deficit than other countries, it likely creates idiosyncratic shocks that result in the business cycle deviating from that in the rest of the currency union. This would violate one of the most important criteria of the optimality of currency areas: the synchronisation of business cycles.
28. The "non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation" refers to increased private sector demand in response to cuts in government spending. If fiscal adjustment credibly signals fiscal sustainability and reduces the expected tax burden on the private sector, private sector demand may start again to compensate for the fall in government demand. Rzońca and Ciżkowicz (2005) present evidence that non-Keynesian effects were indeed in force in new EU member states. Giudice and Turrini (2007) study fiscal consolidations that have been undertaken in the EU in the last 30 years and conclude that roughly half of these episodes have been followed by higher growth. Their results indicate that the consolidations that turned out to be expansionary were more likely to have started in periods with output below potential, and to have been based on expenditure cuts rather than on tax increases.
29. As a result of the budget consolidation measures, government debt in Sweden turned out to be 53% of GDP in 2000 instead of increasing to 128% of GDP, as was projected by the OECD in 1994 (OECD Economic Outlook).
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ANNEX A Council of Ministers approved a law to increase excise duties on tobacco, alcoholic drinks and coffee with an impact of around 0.2% of GDP (Ministry of Finance).
Budget policy measures in CESEE countries
Guarantees for retail bank deposits and savings of individuals were increased to EUR 20 000, almost doubling the previous coverage (Ministry of Finance).
IMF programme expired in January 2009, but the government has not asked for a successor programme (Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU] ). The IMF is advising spending reductions (SETimes.com). Fiscal rules: 1) organic budget law stipulates that public debt, including guarantees, should not exceed 60% of GDP; and 2) the amount of budget deficit should not exceed the amount of capital expenditures. The second rule applies to central and local government. The increase in wages and pensions was made possible by the contingency fund planned for the 2009 budget (Ministry of Finance).
Armenia
The IMF-supported programme includes an increase in social spending of about 0.3% of GDP (IMF), such as increased social payments, or subsidies for newborn children (www.armenianow.com, EIU).
Credits to help SMEs (www.armenianow.com).
Postponing the disbursement of some funds for non-essential projects (EIU); practice of drawing up three-year expenditure plans ended (EIU).
The Parliament rescinded its December 2008 decision to raise excise taxes on imported alcohol and tobacco to avoid reducing imports and then tax revenues. Tax reforms (tax administration, evasion) launched in mid-2008. Reduce tax evasion through compulsory cash registers and incentives to prompt customers to ask for receipts (EIU).
Emergency loans from foreign governments (Russian Federation) and international financial institutions (IFIs) (IMF standby agreement) (RGE Monitor, EIU). Pension reform to alleviate the burden on the system (www.armenianow.com). The IMF approved a USD 540 m loan (5% GDP) to Armenia in March 2009 under the Fund's fast-track Emergency Financing Mechanism procedures, and the country let its currency fall by 21% against the dollar. This emergency funding came shortly after Armenia received poverty reduction funds (RGE Monitor). The amount was increased to USD 823 m (almost 8% GDP) in June 2009 (IMF).
Azerbaijan
Increase spending on social welfare (EIU). The effect of lower oil prices could force transfers from the State Oil Fund (EIU).
Belarus
The government will limit reduction of social spending and income distribution. Healthcare spending, social subsidies and public sector wages are increasing (EIU).
Housing assistance for families with three or more children, non-cash housing subsidies for low-income families, and unemployment assistance will be increased (IMF). Reduce burden on businesses: cuts in turnover tax and introduction of a flat rate of income tax (EIU).
Wages can be frozen; less extensive subsidies; substantial expenditure cuts are to be made: construction, maintenance costs and transport services (EIU).
Import duties and tariffs have been increased (EIU).
IMF standby agreement (USD 3.52 bn, or about 7% of Belarus' GDP) initially approved in January 2009 and increased in June. The revised arrangement will support the government's economic programme and help Belarus contain the effects of a greater than expected impact from the global financial crisis. To reduce the resulting financing gap, the authorities will maintain a balanced budget in 2009, despite lower revenues; will keep monetary policy adequately tight; will allow more exchange rate flexibility within a fluctuation band which is now ±10% around the parity rate; and will deepen structural reforms (IMF). Belarus widened its currency bank in June 2008 (RGE Monitor).
BosniaHerzegovina
VAT burden is to be eased (EIU). Public sector wage cuts, tightened eligibility for invalidity benefits. Measures agreed focus on fiscal consolidation and public sector wage restraint, which, in addition to ensuring stability in the short term, will also help put public finances on a sustainable path (RGE Monitor). Central and local governments have put forward a number of measures to cut spending (EIU), with the Federation needing to make the biggest effort (RGE Monitor).
Increased excise duties (EIU).
Support adequate liquidity and capitalisation of banks under the IMF programme. At the beginning of June, the government said it would cut ministers' pay by 15% in addition to already limiting spending to 90% of the budgeted amount (Forbes). Limits for the disbursement of non-interest expenditure in case of a worse-thanbudgeted revenue outcome (EMU report).
Increases in the mandatory minimum insured income thresholds, in the healthcare contribution rate, in excise rates and in property valuations for local property taxes (total: 1.8% of GDP) (EMU report).
Extension of deposit guarantees up to EUR 50 000, following the European Commission proposals. No capital injections or liquidity or bank support have been implemented (EMU report).
Maintaining positive balance under the consolidated fiscal programme (3% of GDP as set in the Addendum to the last Convergence Programme) in order to ensure public finance long-term sustainability; restricting expenditure reallocated through the budget in the medium term (to 40% of GDP as set in the Addendum to the last Convergence Programme).
Croatia Some anti-recession measures and maintenance of the standard of living of socially vulnerable groups (Ministry of Finance). As welfare (pension, health, unemployment) expenditure increased by EUR 2 bn (about 4% of GDP), there seems to be no space for further increases. Government is planning to shorten the work week and ensure additional money for unemployed in central government budget (Institute of Public Finance [IPF]).
Mostly symbolic spending reductions (about 0.3% of GDP) (IPF), including a public sector wage cut of 6% (Forbes). After cutting spending in April 2009, further cuts were made in a second supplementary budget targeted at state aid to public enterprises; material costs and capital investments were cut, salaries of government officials were further reduced by 5% and parliamentarian pensions by 10%. Third supplementary budget was announced in which further cuts to salaries, pensions and social rights could be expected (Ministry of Finance).
Parliament approves VAT hike from 22% to 23%, additional crisis tax (payroll tax) was introduced with two tax rates: 2% for salaries, pension and capital gains until HRK 3 000 and 4% above HRK 6 000. It has considered revision of existing taxes by raising existing tax rates or broadening tax base (vocational houses tax, inheritance and gift taxes, yachts, etc.). All in all, increase of tax burden is small (IPF). Public expenditure is expected to increase only slightly, as higher social transfers are offset by savings in interest payments (EMU report).
Czech Republic
Several stimulus packages, including higher public sector wages, infrastructure projects (0.4% of GDP), bank recapitalisation, and lower social security (SS) contributions (Ministry of Finance).
Reduced SS contributions and write-down of capital goods will reduce revenue by 0.7% of GDP, while indexation of pensions will increase spending by 0.2% of GDP (EMU report).
Additional spending equal to about 1.9% of GDP financed partly from the government's reserve fund (budgeted but unused funds from previous years) (EIU). More welfare provisions for the unemployed, better protection for employees in bankrupt firms, and higher tax deductions for children (EIU The government formed in December 2008 adopted a substantial fiscal consolidation package that included both wide-ranging tax changes and major expenditure restraints. On the revenue side, the main measures included increases in VAT and excise duties (but a cut in personal income tax); increased corporate income tax and tax on dividends; most tax exemptions removed, broadening the tax base (European Commission), inclusion of some professions in the social security system (European Commission).
So far there has been no need for capital injections or liquidity or bank support. However, for the purpose of supporting or bailing out financial institutions, the following steps have been taken: 1) The deposit insurance amount has been increased from EUR 22 000 to EUR 100 000, equivalent to the amount in litas by paying out 100 % of the insured deposit.
2) The draft Law on Financial Sector Sustainability has been prepared, the purpose of which is to enable the government, when necessary, to take measures such as state guarantees; redemption of bank assets; state involvement in bank capital; taking bank shares for public needs. They would be applied to banks whose financial situation could disturb the smooth functioning of the banking system.
3) The guarantee limit of LTL 3 bn for loans received by the banks or financial liabilities assumed otherwise, in order to strengthen financial stability and credibility of the banking system in Lithuania. Other measures included further reduction in administrative burdens for businesses and measures stimulating entrepreneurship and SME activities by improving the conditions for starting up new businesses. There were also steps taken to speed up the absorption of the EU funds, encourage public-private partnership (PPP) projects and simplify public procurement rules (MoF). IMF flexible credit line in the amount of SDR 13.69 bn as a precautionary instrument only.
Romania Investment programmes will be maintained and social security enhanced. Ambitious capital expenditure programmes for infrastructure, education and health. The IMF-supported programme provides room for additional spending of RON 250 m (amounting to 0.05% of GDP) in 2009 and RON 500 m (0.1% of GDP) in 2010 to improve social protection for the most vulnerable groups during the economic downturn (EIU, IMF). Increase public investment by 1% of GDP (EMU report).
The budget was modified in April 2009 to include considerable fiscal tightening in the three final quarters of the year. Expenditure cuts were concentrated on the public sector wage bill and public sector consumption (all ministries will have budgetary cuts except for social spending) (EIU). Reductions are estimated in -2.2% of GDP (EMU report).
Flat-rate income and profit tax and VAT tax were unchanged, but introduction of a controversial "lump sum" tax (regressive turnover tax) for companies (EIU). Increase of social contribution rate and excise duties. Update of the tax base for local property taxes (in total, 1% of GDP) (EMU report).
Extension of deposit guarantees up to EUR 50 000, following the European Commission proposals (EMU report). The federal expenditure target has been increased by 7% compared with the original level of the budget (EIU). RUB 1.6tn (4.1% of GDP) are earmarked for anti-crisis measures.
Expenditure cuts: general administration, various investment programmes -road building (EIU).
One-off injection from the investment income earned by stabilisation funds (January 2009) (EIU).
Capital injections to banks (EIU).
Russian government capital has gone primarily to larger, more systemically important banks as the government tries to restart lending to consumers and companies. Although Russia has over 1 000 banks, 100 of them account for 90% of the transactions (Moodys). The reserve requirement, which was cut to just 0.5% in October 2008, was raised to 1.5% in June and is scheduled to rise to 2.5% in August. This compares with a reserve requirement of 8% before the cuts started, so the situation is still far from normal (EIU).
The Russian Central Bank and the Bank for Economic Development also will provide money for government anti-crisis measures (EIU). First budgetary deficit since 1999. The deficit will be financed by drawing on the reserve fund, which manages over USD 100 bn and is one of Russia's two sovereign wealth funds (RGE Monitor), but Russia also plans to return to the international bond market in 2010 (EIU). Exchange rate defence: one-third of foreign exchange reserves were lost. After that the rouble depreciated by about 20%. All fiscal rules were cancelled -to be restored later.
Pressure to launch budget reforms discussed but not implemented for about a decade.
Serbia
Increase in pensions in late 2008.
A stimulus package includes a cheap lending facility to Serbian companies that do not lay off workers, and for lending to stimulate exports and to grant a new consumer credit line for the purchase of construction materials (EIU).
The fiscal deficit targets for 2009-10 have been raised, but additional fiscal adjustment measures -mainly falling on recurrent spending -are also being taken (IMF).
Tax increases have been rejected by the government (EIU).
Standby agreement with the IMF (January 2009). In May, the agreement was extended (until March 2011) and increased up to EUR 2.9 bn (10% of Serbia's GDP). The government's unilateral implementation of the interim trade agreement with the EU led to a decline in customs collections (EIU). -Implementation of a decision to eliminate "wage disparities" in public sector.
-Increases in specific transfers in kind (EMU report).
Measures to restrain the wage bill (EMU report).
Increase in excise duties (0.9% of GDP) (EMU report).
The government will make available EUR 12 bn (30% GDP) in guarantees for bank loans, as well as temporary unlimited guarantees for all retail bank deposits and savings.
Consultations on structural reforms (healthcare, pensions, social security system, labour market and public sector). Implementation, if agreement is reached, will not be immediate (Slovenia is among the group of countries that will have to increase their age-related public expenditure the most) (EIU). 
